Tenants at-risk-of-poverty induced by housing expenditure - exploratory analyses with EU-SILC by Haffner, Marietta et al.
  
 
Tenants at-risk-of-poverty induced by 
housing expenditure – exploratory  
analyses with EU-SILC 
 
 
Marietta Haffner, Kees Dol & Kristof Heylen 
 
OTB Working papers 2014-03 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OTB - Research for the Built Environment 
Delft University of Technology 
Jaffalaan 9, 2628 BX  Delft, The Netherlands 
Tel.  +31 (0)15 278 30 05 
Fax  +31 (0)15 278 44 22 
E-mail mailbox@otb.tudelft.nl 
http://www.otb.tudelft.nl 
 
OTB - Research for the Built Environment seeks to make a visible contribution to society by helping to 
solve social problems in the field of the built environment. We do this by means of our specialist scien-
tific research in this area as part of Delft University of Technology and in close cooperation with facul-
ties. The emphasis lies on scientific impact and social relevance. We aim to increase the significance 
of scientific research, while continuing to focus on the vital exchange between problem-oriented and 
practically applicable research. 
  
 
Tenants at-risk-of-poverty induced by 
housing expenditure – exploratory analyses 
with EU-SILC1 
 
Marietta Haffner1,2,3 
 
Kees Dol1 
 
Kristof Heylen3,4 
 
1 OTB – Research for the Built Environment, Faculty of Architecture and the Built 
Environment, Delft University of Technology, Jaffalaan 9, 2628 BX Delft, 
+31-15-27-83523, www.otb.tudelft.nl, m.e.a.haffner@tudelft.nl 
 
2 College of Design and Social Context, AHURI at RMIT University, Melbourne; 
CCHPR, Department of Land Economy, Cambridge University 
 
3 Steunpunt Wonen, Leuven 
 
4 Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA), University of Leuven 
 
OTB Working papers 2014-03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Combating poverty and social exclusion is a core policy issue in the European Union (EU). The Statis-
tics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) database facilitates analyses of the extent of poverty 
and social exclusion. One of the indicators built from the database is the at-risk-of-poverty indicator. 
Applied to households, it indicates that any household with an income less than 60% of the median 
equivalized household income in a country is at risk of poverty. A fundamental question not covered 
by EU-SILC indicators concerns the impact of housing expenditure on poverty. The concept of residual 
income – disposable income after deducting housing expenses – is used to compose an indicator to 
identify households at risk of poverty as a direct result of the squeeze between incomes and housing 
expenses.  
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Introduction 
The fight against poverty and social exclusion has become a core topic – at least in words – in the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). Since 2001, the member states have drawn up National Action Plans for Social In-
clusion. Such a plan is one of the five instruments of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), where-
by EU countries cooperate to meet the goals set at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000. Be-
sides pursuing sustainable economic growth and increasing levels of employment, efforts are made to 
promote social inclusion by fighting poverty and social exclusion (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2010a2; 
Dienst Armoedebeleid, not dated; European Commission, 2009). 
The other four instruments of the OMC pertain to synthesizing the national reports and setting com-
mon goals to fight poverty. To make progress, the extent of poverty and social exclusion must be 
measured, so indicators had to be designed; these were last revised in 2009. The one referring to a 
country’s designated poverty line is based on income; it indicates the share of the population that is 
‘at risk of poverty’. Any household with a disposable income below this norm is thought to be ‘income-
poor’. As a monetary indicator, it can be calculated with data from the EU Survey of Income and Liv-
ing Conditions (EU-SILC).  
Currently used indicators of social exclusion based on EU-SILC data do not include a monetary one, 
which would show the impact of housing, but only non-monetary ones (material deprivation indica-
tors, see below). This paper seeks to fill that gap by applying an at-risk-of-poverty indicator that in-
corporates on-going housing expenses. These account for a large and rather inflexible share of 
household income, at least in the short term. Thus, housing expenses may explain why households 
become ‘at risk of poverty’ (or ‘poor’), while in light of their disposable income they would not be con-
sidered at risk. With the concept of residual income – disposable income after the deduction of hous-
ing expenses – it is possible to determine which households are at risk of poverty as a direct result of 
the squeeze between incomes and housing expenses. They are not poor with respect to disposable 
income but – using a relative definition of poverty – in terms of their residual income. In this ap-
proach, housing expenses are considered unaffordable when the residual income is below the relative 
poverty threshold.  
This paper makes these calculations on the basis of disposable and residual income. It then analyzes 
the feasibility of using the EU-SILC for that purpose. Last, but not least, it discusses the usefulness of 
making calculations in which a relative instead of an absolute norm is applied when determining 
whether consumption is affordable. To provide a context for this exercise, the paper starts with a brief 
discussion of the at-risk-of-poverty indicator and the concept of residual income. 
 
At-risk-of-poverty indicator 
According to Bradshaw and Mayhew (2010a: 8), poverty in the EU is “relative to a particular country 
at a particular time”. They elaborate as follows: “There was and is a strong justification for this ap-
proach rooted in social science understandings. Poverty in the post war period has been understood 
as a relative concept that went beyond the notions of poverty as a lack of basic physical needs but 
aspired to social participation standards for human functioning.” In the same vein, we define poverty 
in relative terms that go beyond the lack of basic physical needs in order to measure the extent of 
participation in society. 
Fusco et al. (2010: 9) point out that the EU Council of Ministers had already agreed in 1985 on a defi-
nition of poverty: “the persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to ex-
clude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State to which they belong.” By 
implication, if poverty were eliminated, there would be no more social exclusion, only social inclusion. 
Poverty in this definition has two aspects: input, being resources; and outcome, being the minimum 
acceptable way of life, later redefined as ’ordinary’ or ‘minimum living pattern’ (Fusco et al., 2010: 9). 
On the input side, measuring the lack of financial resources has come to be known as the income 
poverty approach. It is perceived as “an indirect approach to poverty and social exclusion” because it 
focuses on the available resources instead of the direct outcomes for households. Silver and Miller 
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(2003) refer to “the non-monetary indicators of material deprivation” (Fusco et al., 2010: 9), which 
are used to measure the direct outcomes, as “the real European innovation ... in the development of 
nonmonetary indicators of ‘social exclusion,’ transcending economists’ focus on money.” (Silver and 
Miller, 2003: 3). Measuring poverty in terms of inputs and outcomes thus requires the use of multiple 
indicators; indeed, the EU considers poverty as a multidimensional concept. And having applied two 
indicators of material deprivation since 2009 (European Commission, 2009), the EU clearly demon-
strates its commitment to a broad definition of poverty and social exclusion, and by extension to a 
broad definition of social inclusion.  
This paper is centered on the at-risk-of-poverty rate because it can distinguish whether people are in-
come-poor (Fusco et al., 2010: 9) on the basis of their housing expenses. So far, the EU-SILC has not 
been used to design a monetary indicator that could show the effect of housing expenditure on pov-
erty. In view of the above definition of poverty, a concept based solely on monetary resources e.g., 
financial income, cannot fully capture the situation of poverty. In other words, it can be no more than 
an indirect indicator of living standards (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2010a: 9). 
Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU, defines the at-risk-of-poverty rate thus:  
 
The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people with an equivalised disposa-
ble income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which 
is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income after so-
cial transfers. This indicator does not measure wealth or poverty, but low in-
come in comparison to other residents in that country, which does not neces-
sarily imply a low standard of living. 
 
‘Equivalized’ means that the income is corrected for household composition; thus, any scale ad-
vantages of a larger household are taken into account. The modified OECD scale is applied to deter-
mine the extent of the correction. A weight of 1 is assigned to the first adult member of the house-
hold, a weight of 0.5 to each other member of 14 years or older, and a weight of 0.3 to each one un-
der 14. Household income is divided by the total of the weights to calculate income per person. We  
use this scale because of a lack alternatives, but realize that the OECD itself has abandoned the scale 
because of its lack of a scientific basis (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2010a: 9). 
Bradshaw and Mayhew (2010a) state that the 60% poverty line has been set arbitrarily. Other per-
centages are also in use, such as the 50% poverty line currently applied by the OECD. According to 
the definition of the at-risk-of-poverty rate, nothing can be said about the standard of living. And it 
has become more difficult to interpret the indicator from a comparative perspective since the en-
largement of the EU-15. For instance, it may be lower in a country that is economically less advanced 
than in one that is more advanced, implying that a larger share of the population is ‘at risk of poverty’ 
in the richer than in the poorer country. These types of outcomes are difficult to interpret. 
In sum, these interpretations should be taken into account when using this indicator, especially in 
cross-country comparisons.  Its appeal lies in the possibility to include the effect of housing expenses 
on social exclusion, which inspired us to conduct this exercise. 
 
Residual income 
Why would one want to consider housing expenses when determining the extent of poverty or social 
exclusion? As housing expenses usually make up a large chunk of household income and are rather 
inflexible in the short term, there is reason to believe they can push households into poverty. If so, 
the housing will be unaffordable (Freeman et al., 2000; Haffner and Heylen, 2011; Stone, 2006; Tun-
stall et al., 2013). The main components of expenses are rent for tenants and mortgage expenses for 
owner-occupiers. The concept of residual income, defined as disposable income minus the on-going 
housing expenses allows us to express the non-housing consumption capacity of a household after 
paying for housing (Hancock, 1993). Housing consumption is considered ‘unaffordable’ if the residual 
income is too low for the consumption of other necessary goods and services.  
  
 
The balance of housing consumption and non-housing consumption in the total household budget de-
termines whether a household can participate in the society it is living in. The extent of participation 
may be expressed in an absolute or a relative way (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2010a; Hancock, 1993; 
Haffner and Winters, 2013; Stone, 2006). The absolute method entails setting a budget for a house-
hold at a location and a point in time. It is usually established by government and/or scientific re-
search. Referred to either as a minimum budget or as a modest but adequate budget, the latter type 
would allow a more extensive participation in society than the former. 
The absolute budget, however, is not the focus of attention here, as it has not been calculated for all 
EU countries. The at-risk-of-poverty rate will be used instead, and its usefulness for such an analysis 
will be ascertained. It allows the researcher to distinguish the effect of housing expenses from the ef-
fect of income on households ending up at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Thus it is a useful 
means to elucidate the effect of unaffordable housing within the bigger picture of social exclusion.  
The approach of calculating the at-risk-of-poverty rate for residual income resembles the income pov-
erty approach, as it only includes cash-flow income and cash-flow expenses (e.g., rent and mortgage 
interest). Residual income serves as a monetary measure of outcome in terms of affordable or unaf-
fordable housing. 
An alternative monetary approach could use total income instead of disposable income (Barr, 1998; 
Gardiner et al., 1995). Total income would include imputed income from property for homeowners or 
the subsidized component of rent for tenants. It would also include income that can be imputed from 
free or subsidized consumption of goods and services such as healthcare or education (Gardiner et al., 
1995; Smeeding et al., 1993). The database to be used here (EU-SILC; see below) still needs im-
provement regarding imputed rent calculations for housing and consistent data processing (Törmä-
lehto and Sauli, 2010: 39; Juntto and Reijo, 2010). Until these adjustments have been made, imputed 
rent cannot be included in the income calculation.  
Therefore, the concept of residual income will be tested in relation to the at-risk-of-poverty rate. This 
is the financial side of poverty. Before a final conclusion about at risk of poverty can be made, the 
amount of housing quality that is being consumed also needs to be charted (Maclennan and Williams, 
1990: 9). That norm is needed to identify cases of overconsumption and underconsumption of hous-
ing (Hancock, 1993; Thalmann, 1999). In the former, unaffordable housing is the result of consuming 
too much quality; in the latter, affordable housing is the result of too little quality. The inclusion of 
quality in the analysis permits us to draw conclusions about someone’s ability to participate in society 
and then to make generalizations about nonmonetary housing outcomes.  
 
Methodology and possibilities with EU-SILC 
A country’s at-risk-of-poverty rate is calculated on the basis of disposable income (rate before housing 
expenses are deducted). The median equivalized disposable household income is the starting point for 
calculating the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. Table 1 shows the amount of income associated with the 
at-risk-of poverty threshold (or poverty line) in each country; it is the highest in Luxembourg (over 
19,000 Euro) and the lowest in Portugal (less than 5,000 Euro).  
To determine the effect of housing expenses on a country’s at-risk-of-poverty rate, we have to calcu-
late that rate on the basis of residual income – i.e., after deducting housing expenses from disposable 
income (Haffner et al., 2013). For tenants, the rents, including housing allowances, are subtracted 
from disposable income; for owner-occupiers,  mortgage interest, including any tax effect, is deduct-
ed. Accordingly, the residual income definition used here excludes any housing income components. 
In the usual calculation of housing expenditure for owner-occupiers, either the mortgage repayment is 
included in expenditure (cash-flow approach) or the opportunity cost of invested capital is included 
(user cost of capital or imputed rent). When using the EU-SILC, however, neither of these approaches 
can be applied completely. For the cash-flow approach, the information on mortgage repayments is 
not available in the European EU-SILC data (see above; Törmälehto and Sauli, 2010).3 As residual in-
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come is based on housing expenditure and not on housing cost, expenditure is used. The implication 
for owner-occupiers is that mortgage repayment is not deducted from disposable income, which 
would otherwise be deducted, at least in affordability analyses from a housing point of view. Residual 
income will then be higher, so it will be overestimated for the total population. Because of this draw-
back, we will focus on tenants in our analyses, after having determined the residual income for the 
whole population. Table 1 shows these after-housing poverty thresholds and compares them with the 
before-housing poverty threshold. As may be observed, the ranking of the countries differs for these 
thresholds, suggesting that housing expenditure plays a different role in each country. The discrepan-
cy arises from the range of housing expenses for various tenures and the shares in each of the groups 
discerned (owner-occupiers and tenants; owner-occupiers with or without a mortgage).  
The results in Table 1 pertain to most of the EU-15 countries and reflect the diverging interpretations 
of poverty outcomes (see above). The East-European countries are much less dependent on housing 
expenditure data to map poverty than West-European countries. The reason is that their share of ten-
ants is generally (with some exceptions, e.g., Czech Republic and Poland) much lower than in many 
West-European countries. Thus, the group with high housing expenses is smaller. The share of owner-
occupiers with low housing expenses is high in Eastern Europe because over 80% of the homeowners 
have no mortgage (Haffner et al., 2012). 
 
Table 1 At-risk-of-poverty threshold in the EU-15 based on 60% of median equivalized 
disposable household income and the at-risk-of-poverty threshold based on 
60% of equivalized median residual household income (in Euro) 
 At-risk-of-poverty threshold  
 based on  
equivalized disposable household 
income 
based on  
equivalized residual household income 
Luxembourg 19,465 18,310 
Denmark 14,125 11,800 
Ireland 13,035 11,905 
Sweden 12,300 10,945 
Finland 12,075 10,905 
France 11,945 10,930 
Austria 11,865 11,045 
Netherlands 11,835 10,235 
Belgium 11,190 10,165 
United Kingdom 9,595 8,600 
Italy 9,355 8,965 
Spain 7,920 7,425 
Greece 6,785 6,400 
Portugal 4,920 4,615 
*) Germany is excluded because of missing housing expenses for owner-occupiers. 
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations.  
 
Subtraction of the after-housing rate from the before-housing rate yields four groups of households 
per country (Table 2). Group D will not be in the at-risk-of-poverty group either before or after the 
deduction of housing expenses, while group A will be deemed poor in both instances. Group B house-
holds will be able to escape the poverty group because of their low housing expenses, while group C 
will be at risk of poverty induced by their high housing expenses. 
                                                                                                                                                   
allowances) into a at-risk-of- poverty indicator 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Housing_cost_overburden_rate). 
  
 
Table 2  Households at risk of poverty before and after housing expenses 
At risk of poverty after housing 
expenses 
At risk of poverty before housing expenses 
 Yes No 
Yes Group A Group C 
No Group B Group D 
Source: Authors, forthcoming.  
The calculations will be based on Eurostat’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC; 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/introdu
ction). As set forth above, its main aim is to collect up-to-date and internationally comparative data on 
income, the level and stratification of poverty, and the extent of social exclusion in the European Un-
ion. This study uses the 2009 database on households. We selected households that were almost cer-
tainly living in their own dwelling and not in student accommodation or a home for the elderly. Older 
and young households with just one room at their disposal were not selected as these were interpret-
ed as not living in independent units. The SILC database sets the rental cost for those who get their 
dwelling for free (from their family or employer) at ‘missing’, as they are not paying any rent. These 
households are omitted here as they form a group that is quite small in most Western European coun-
tries. The 2009 database used income data that are mostly from 2008 and other data from 2009. This 
implies that figures on income and rent will not be from the same year. As it will be impossible to cor-
rect either figure for all countries for the same year, the calculations must be regarded as indicative. 
However, it should be kept in mind that these amounts may not always increase annually, so there 
may not be any bias.  
 
Tenants at risk of poverty 
As we expect to find that the extent of poverty in a country is dependent on the type of welfare state, 
the EU-15 countries will be grouped according to four welfare state regimes. Three of those in Europe 
are based on the well-known work of Esping-Anderson (1990). One is called the conservative or cor-
poratist welfare regime and includes countries in Western Europe (here Austria, Belgium, France, Lux-
embourg, and the Netherlands). The other welfare state regimes are the social-democratic (Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden) and Anglo-Saxon or liberal (Ireland and United Kingdom). The conserva-
tive/corporatist regime is characterized by a link between social security rights and participation in the 
labor market, with differences depending on employment type. Its benefits are rather generous and 
are aimed at maintaining living standards. The social-democratic regime gives more attention to the 
combination of work and care and to active employment policy. Income distributions tend to be nar-
rower in countries with social-democratic regimes since a rather large number of universal measures 
are provided, benefits are generous, and coverage of risks is broad. The liberal model, on the other 
hand, minimizes the role of the state, tends to individualize risks, and promotes insurance by the mar-
ket.  
The typology of Esping-Andersen did not take housing policy into consideration. Debate on that typol-
ogy has led some housing researchers to expand it to include other types of welfare state (Hoekstra 
and Reitsma, 2002). One such type is the Mediterranean regime (represented by Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, and Spain). It has a lower level of state intervention, lower benefit levels, and a more central role 
for family care than the other regimes, Allen et al. (2004) conclude when they relate housing to the 
welfare state. 
In line with our expectations, Figure 1 shows that – when all households are considered – the poverty 
rates in countries with a corporatist or social-democratic welfare state regime are generally lower than 
in countries with a liberal or especially a Mediterranean welfare state regime. The poverty rates for 
the former vary between 10% and 15%, whereas the rates for the latter exceed 15% (except for Ire-
land which almost hits the 15% mark). However, when only tenants are taken into account, a differ-
ent picture emerges. In each country, tenants are more at risk of poverty than average, but the dif-
ference from the overall rate diverges strongly from one country to the next. In two of the corporatist 
  
 
countries, Belgium and Luxembourg, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for tenants is rather high. The high 
rate for Finland stands out among countries with a social-democratic regime. In both countries with a 
liberal regime, tenants are significantly more at risk of poverty than the population at large. The re-
sults for the Mediterranean regime are mixed, with Italy and Spain showing rather high poverty rates 
for tenants. These outcomes suggest that the welfare difference between tenants and homeowners is 
caused by mechanisms other than those inherent to the regimes. Therefore, the welfare regime classi-
fication will no longer be used in the figures and tables from here on; the countries will be ordered 
from low to high value. 
As Figure 2 shows, in each country the at-risk-of-poverty rate for tenants, based on residual income, 
is considerably higher than the rate for all households. The countries to the right of Greece (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom) differ by more than 24 percentage points.  
 
Figure 1 At-risk-of-poverty rate based on disposable income for tenant households and 
for all households in the EU-15*, 2008/2009 
 
*) Germany is excluded because of missing housing expenses for owner-occupiers.  
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2 At-risk-of-poverty rate based on residual income for tenant households and for 
all households in the EU-15, 2008/2009 
 
*) Countries with more than one-third missing cases for rent are excluded.  
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
  
 
Figure 3 depicts the share of tenants falling below the poverty line in terms of residual income, though 
not below the standard poverty line (based on disposable income). We say these tenants are ‘at risk 
of poverty induced by rent’. Their share is over 10% everywhere except Ireland. The highest rates are 
not found in countries with a conservative/corporatist regime but rather in Finland (22%), Sweden 
(25%), and the United Kingdom (24%).   
 
Figure 3 Share of tenants at risk of poverty induced by rent in the EU-15, 2008/2009 
 
*) Countries with more than one-third missing cases for rent are excluded.  
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
Since the at-risk of-poverty rate is a measure of income inequality, the results shown in Figures 2 and 
3 may be explained by two mechanisms. First, the more of their disposable income that tenants spend 
on housing, the worse their position becomes in the income distribution (of residual income), putting 
them at greater risk of poverty than homeowners, who tend to spend less of their budget on housing 
(Haffner et al., (2012) for EU-SILC calculations). This effect is strengthened by the tendency for poor-
er people to have a higher rent-to-income ratio, which is an idea that has long been accepted for so-
called necessary consumption goods (known as the Schwabe law on rent; Hulchanski, 1995). And in-
deed, the share of income spent on rent is higher for tenants at the bottom of the income distribution 
(Haffner and Dol (2011) for EU-SILC calculations).  
Figure 4 presents the share of households who are not at risk of poverty according to either the 
standard definition or the residual income definition. This group is not in poverty before or after pay-
ing their housing expenses. Again, the results are not consistent within the types of welfare state re-
gime. For instance, one country with a liberal regime has the lowest share (the United Kingdom, with 
50%) while another has the highest (Ireland, with close to 70%). The share not facing poverty is ra-
ther low in Finland and Sweden (just over 50%) but rather high in Denmark (over 60%). The shares 
in corporatist countries are also scattered, with Belgium near 55% and Austria close to 70%. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4 Share of tenants not in income poverty based on disposable and residual in-
come in the EU-15, 2008/2009 
 
*) Countries with more than one-third missing cases for rent are excluded.  
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
 
Characteristics of tenants at risk of poverty 
This section presents several characteristics of tenants who are ‘at risk of poverty induced by rent’ or  
‘in poverty due to housing expenditure’. To interpret the analysis, the results are compared to those 
for tenants who are in poverty according to both definitions and for tenants who are not at risk of 
poverty by either one or the other. These three groups are presented according to income, rent level, 
and economic activity status. 
The order in which the countries are presented in Table 3 is based on the ranking in Figure 3, running 
from the lowest to the highest share of tenants at risk of poverty induced by rent. It shows the distri-
bution according to tertiles of equivalized income. The group that is income-poor by both definitions 
(middle column) falls entirely within the first income tertile in each country. This is logical since these 
are the households with the lowest incomes.   
The group that is not poor by either definition (left column) is hardly represented in the first tertile but 
mainly in the second and third. In contrast, those who are poor due to housing expenses (also called 
poor by housing; right column) are strongly represented in the first and second income tertile and on-
ly by exception in the one. This outcome means that those tenants in the second and third income 
tertile who are among ‘the poor after housing expenses’ are at risk of poverty because of their rent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3 Tenants according to type of income poverty1 and according to income 
tertile of equivalized disposable household income in EU-15 countries2, 
2008/2009 
 Tertiles Not in income poverty In income poverty,  
both definitions
1
 
In income poverty, in-
duced by housing ex-
penses 
Ireland 1 9 100 40 
 2 42 0 59 
 3 49 0 1 
Austria 1 6 100 77 
 2 44 0 23 
 3 50 0 0 
France 1 6 100 72 
 2 46 0 26 
 3 48 0 1 
Greece 1 4 100 62 
 2 42 0 38 
 3 53 0 0 
Luxembourg 1 1 100 32 
 2 39 0 67 
 3 60 0 1 
Netherlands 1 7 100 70 
 2 43 0 29 
 3 51 0 1 
Denmark 1 8 100 63 
 2 41 0 36 
 3 51 0 2 
Belgium 1 1 100 45 
 2 41 0 53 
 3 58 0 2 
Finland 1 0 100 30 
 2 35 0 70 
 3 65 0 0 
United Kingdom 1 1 100 31 
 2 39 0 64 
 3 61 0 5 
Sweden 1 0 100 48 
 2 39 0 51 
 3 61 0 1 
1 In income poverty based on disposable income and residual income.  
2 Countries with too few cases are not included. Columns add up to 100% per country. 
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the three groups over tertiles of equivalized net rent. In six  of the 
eleven countries, the largest share of the poor by housing expenses is found in the third (highest) rent 
tertile. In each country, the poor by housing are spread over the three rent tertiles, but less equally 
than the group that is not in income poverty (i.e., not considered poor by one of the definitions). The 
group that is poor by both definitions is overrepresented in the first tertile, except for Denmark, and is 
highest in Finland and France (at 70% and 75%, respectively). This is a logical result, given that this 
is the group with the lowest incomes, implying that their rents are high in comparison to income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 4 Tenants according to type of income poverty1 and according to income 
tertile of net rent in EU-15 countries2, 2008/2009 
 Tertiles Not in income pov-
erty 
In income poverty, 
both definitions
1
 
In income poverty, 
induced by housing 
expenses 
Ireland 1 28 53 21 
 2 34 31 32 
 3 37 16 47 
Austria 1 32 47 25 
 2 34 33 31 
 3 34 20 43 
France 1 21 75 34 
 2 38 17 33 
 3 41 8 33 
Greece 1 30 53 19 
 2 36 25 31 
 3 33 22 50 
Luxembourg 1 28 52 18 
2 29 31 52 
 3 43 16 30 
Netherlands 1 25 66 33 
 2 35 22 38 
 3 40 12 29 
Denmark 1 35 32 29 
2 33 27 38 
 3 32 41 32 
Belgium 1 30 51 21 
 2 35 32 32 
 3 36 17 47 
Finland 1 15 70 32 
 2 36 20 42 
 3 48 10 26 
United Kingdom 1 26 45 37 
 2 39 30 25 
 3 36 24 38 
Sweden 1 29 47 32 
 2 37 25 31 
 3 35 27 37 
1 In income poverty based on disposable income and residual income.  
2 Countries with too few cases are not included. Columns add up to 100% per country. 
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’  calculations. 
 
Table 5 shows the effect of dividing the three groups according to the economic activity status of the 
reference person of the household. In the group in which no one is poor (by one of the two defini-
tions), a large majority are working, ranging from 55% in the Netherlands and 58% in Denmark to 
80% in Sweden and 81% in Finland. Remarkably, among tenants who are at risk of poverty induced 
by housing, pensioners are strongly overrepresented; they even have the highest share in Belgium 
(39%), Sweden (52%), and Denmark (60%). In the Netherlands and Ireland, in contrast, the catego-
ry of other inactive people (unemployed, sick) is the largest, at respectively  48% and 69%. The 
group that is at risk of poverty by both definitions contains fewer pensioners but more ‘other inactive’ 
people. The latter are strongly overrepresented in this group, accounting for 60% in the Netherlands 
and 75% in Ireland. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5 Tenants according to type of income poverty1 and according to econom-
ic activity status of the household reference person in EU-15 countries2, 
2008/2009 
  Not in income 
poverty 
In income 
poverty, 
both defini-
tions
1
 
In income 
poverty, in-
duced by 
housing ex-
penses 
Total 
Ireland Employment 63 18 26 50 
 Other inactive 32 75 69 45 
 Retired 5 7 5 6 
Austria Employment 70 41 54 63 
 Other inactive 6 38 17 13 
 Retired 24 21 28 24 
France Employment 70 48 58 64 
 Other inactive 8 35 14 14 
 Retired 22 17 28 21 
Greece Employment 77 67 50 71 
 Other inactive 9 22 35 16 
 Retired 13 11 15 13 
Luxembourg Employment 78 63 67 72 
 Other inactive 8 30 17 16 
 Retired 14 7 17 13 
Netherlands Employment 55 33 26 46 
 Other inactive 19 60 48 31 
 Retired 26 7 26 23 
Denmark Employment 58 43 17 48 
 Other inactive 18 47 23 24 
 Retired 24 10 60 28 
Belgium Employment 73 26 33 54 
 Other inactive 12 54 28 25 
 Retired 15 20 39 21 
Finland Employment 81 25 34 56 
 Other inactive 12 61 35 30 
 Retired 7 14 31 14 
United Kingdom Employment 69 29 38 52 
 Other inactive 11 55 31 27 
 Retired 20 16 31 22 
Sweden Employment 80 38 28 58 
 Other inactive 9 37 20 18 
 Retired 12 25 52 25 
1 In income poverty based on disposable income and residual income.  
2 Countries with too few cases are not included. ‘Other inactive’ includes being sick/disabled, engaged in study 
and housekeeping. Columns add up to 100% per country.  
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
 
Underconsumption and overconsumption of housing by tenants at risk of poverty 
To analyze the unaffordability of rent (housing-induced risk of poverty), we also have to determine 
the extent of overconsumption and underconsumption of housing. That information provides the 
grounds to distinguish which households overconsume, and thus pay an unaffordable rent, from those  
  
 
that underconsume, and thus pay an affordable rent (Maclennan and Williams, 1990). The quality of 
housing being consumed thus plays an important role in determining the extent of its affordability. 
Although many indicators of housing quality exist, and they somehow should be combined to a com-
prehensive indicator of quality, this article adopts the widely accepted one of overcrowding, by lack of 
alternatives that present the level of housing quality in a comprehensive way. Given the scope of this 
study, we only present some general outcomes, which will need further investigation in the future.  
First, we explore whether households who are at risk of poverty due to housing expenses are living in 
overcrowded dwellings (underconsumption). If so, these households may be getting poor quality, giv-
en the high price of the dwelling. That situation may also reveal something about very large house-
holds who need to spend a substantial amount of their income on housing but who still do not have 
enough rooms.  
Secondly, we explore possible overconsumption among those who are at risk of poverty because of 
their housing expenses. For these households the dwelling may be considered too large. According to 
the Eurostat definition of overcrowding, households should have at least: one living room + one bed-
room for an adult partner couple + one bedroom per single adult (from 18 years) + one bedroom per 
two teenagers (12 through 17 years) of the same sex + one bedroom per two children (under 12 
years old). 
Our definition of overconsumption of housing is arbitrary and only intended as a point of departure. 
We define it here as the situation whereby households have more than one room above the general 
‘overcrowding’ benchmark. 
Figure 5 charts that situation for tenants. The order of the countries is based on the share of poverty 
induced by housing expenses, running from low to high. At 3% and 4% respectively, the incidence of 
overcrowding is lowest in the Netherlands and Denmark. It is the highest in Greece and Luxembourg, 
affecting 21% and 23% of households respectively. In all countries the incidence of overcrowding is 
lower for the group in poverty induced by housing expenses than for the group of households that are 
at risk of poverty before and after housing expenditure. This suggests that poor households try to 
save money on rent by choosing dwellings of a lower quality. 
In some countries (Greece, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark), the share of households who are not in 
poverty but living in overcrowded conditions is larger than the group that is at risk of poverty because 
of housing expenses.  In other countries (Luxembourg, Austria, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands), the share of those who are not poor but do live in overcrowded conditions is 
smaller than the share of households whose housing expenses put them at risk of poverty.  
Figure 6 depicts ‘overconsumption’ of housing by the three groups.  While our definition of housing 
overconsumption may be unrealistic for households who are not in poverty, it serves as a benchmark 
for comparison with the other two groups. As one would expect, this group overconsumes in all coun-
tries except Ireland, where the group in poverty by housing expenses is the largest. The chance of 
overconsuming housing for those who are ‘poor induced by housing expenses’ compared to those who 
are ‘always’ at risk of poverty is somewhat higher, except in Denmark and Greece. Apparently, some 
of the tenants in poverty by housing are in this situation because they consume ‘too much’ housing 
quality (or more than necessary).  
  
 
Figure 5 Tenants according to type of income poverty and overcrowding in the EU-151 
 
1 Countries with too few cases are not included. Information on Ireland is incomplete. The order of countries is 
based on the share of poverty induced by housing expenses. 
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
 
The overall conclusion is that households at risk of poverty due to housing expenses form a varied 
group. Only in France is the share of overconsumers (14%) equal to that of underconsumers. In a 
number of countries, the share of overconsumers is larger than that of underconsumers: Ireland 
(66%), the Netherlands (45%), Belgium (45%), United Kingdom (8%), and Denmark (7%). It is the 
other way around in Greece (19%) and the remaining countries (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Luxem-
bourg), where the share varies between 1% and 4%. 
The notion of overconsumption implies that consumption can be reduced. In principle, a household 
would in due course be able to move to a ‘suitable’ dwelling. That might help the household get out of 
the group for whom renting is unaffordable and thereby out of the at-risk-of-poverty group. However, 
caution must be exercised; what we define as overconsumption may be a normal situation in certain 
countries. It should also be noted that information is lacking on variation in room sizes per country. In 
some countries there may be practices (or time frames) providing a large number of small (bed)rooms 
per dwelling, suggesting that these dwellings are not overcrowded room-wise but perhaps space-wise.  
 
  
 
Figure 6 Tenants according to type of income poverty and overconsumption in the EU-
151 
 
1 Countries with too few cases are not included. The order of countries is based on the share of poverty in-
duced by housing expenses. 
Source: EU-SILC 2009, authors’ calculations. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to examine the usefulness of the indicator ‘at risk of poverty induced by 
housing expenses’ as applied with the EU-SILC database. As a new indicator of social exclusion that 
can be regarded as an addition to the existing package of Eurostat indicators, it proves its worth by 
measuring the impact of housing expenditure on the at-risk-of-poverty status of households. This indi-
cator will thereby allow researchers to identify a group that is not considered poor by the standard 
approach based on disposable income and a poverty line (60% of median equivalized income in our 
case) but that is found to be poor when residual income is applied instead (and thus actual rather 
than normative housing expenses are accounted for). The poverty situation of the ‘poor by housing’ 
may then be said to stem from the relatively large share of income that is spent on housing.  
Our calculations were based on the European EU-SILC dataset, in which the data for owner-occupiers 
did not permit us to calculate this poverty indicator on the basis of cash flows. Therefore, our analysis 
was limited to the rental sector. However, not being able to integrate mortgage repayments in ex-
penditure (only mortgage interest payments) overestimates household income for owner-occupiers 
with a mortgage. With that caveat, the indicator, though flawed, can still be applied. 
We performed the analyses at the household level, which is unusual in poverty studies. We did so be-
cause housing expenses and residual income are only relevant at that level. The results revealed that 
in each European country that we included, the poverty rate for tenants as calculated with residual 
income data (after deducting housing expenses from disposable income) is higher than the rate based 
on disposable income (before deducting housing expenses). By implication, the poverty rate for own-
er-occupiers is lower. This suggests that housing expenses weigh heavier on the budgets of low-
income tenants than on those for tenants with higher incomes. In addition, each country was found to 
have a share of households that are poor as a result of housing expenses.  
  
 
Additional analyses revealed that the group considered poor in terms of their housing expenses has a 
significantly different composition than the group considered poor in terms of both disposable and re-
sidual income.  
Tenants who are pushed into poverty by their housing expenses are represented in the first income 
tertile but also in the second, whereas tenants who are in poverty by both definitions are only found 
in the first tertile. Put differently, it is not only the households with the lowest incomes who are con-
sidered poor when housing expenses are taken into account, but also middle-income tenants. Fur-
thermore, in each country retired people are overrepresented among the ‘poor by housing’ compared 
to the not-in-poverty group and the group in poverty before and after housing expenditure. The in-
come of retirees is lower than during their working life, but they still have to pay the same amount of 
rent. Therefore, their relatively high housing expenses put them at risk of poverty. The unemployed 
and sick, on the other hand, are strongly overrepresented in the group that is considered poor in 
terms of both disposable and residual income.  
In addition, two-thirds of the group of ‘poor by housing’ in most countries consists of households that 
pay a medium or high rent (second and third tertile). This indicates that some could have stayed out 
of poverty if they had chosen to rent a cheaper dwelling. Of course, the household composition may 
not permit such a choice. 
Finally, we determined the proportion of unaffordability and poverty that may be caused by the over-
consumption of housing. The analysis was done to show the proportion of affordability or ‘not being 
income-poor’ that may be attributed to the underconsumption of housing (overcrowding). Our explo-
ration of overconsumption (with an arbitrary definition based on number of rooms) suggests that, 
compared to the households at risk of poverty by both definitions, the rate of overconsumption for 
households in poverty induced by housing expenditure is somewhat higher. Overcrowding rates based 
on the Eurostat definition for those at risk of poverty because of high housing expenses are much 
lower than those for households who are ‘always’ at risk of poverty. Compared to households who are 
‘never’ at risk of poverty, overcrowding rates of households with high housing expenses are some-
times lower, while overconsumption is always higher.  
The at-risk-of-poverty concept based on residual income is closely related to the concept of the af-
fordability of rent. From the latter perspective, we can regard housing as unaffordable when a house-
hold’s residual income is lower than 60% of the median. Such households fall into two categories: 
those considered to have an affordability problem due to low income (poor by both definitions), and 
those who have an affordable problem due to high housing expenses (poor induced by housing).  
Our last observation concerns the ‘relative standard’ based on actual housing expenditure that was 
used here, also for residual income. The standard approach for assessing residual income would be to 
define an absolute affordability norm (a budget based on the needs of household). One difference be-
tween a relative standard for residual income and an absolute standard is that the relative threshold is 
arbitrarily chosen, whereas absolute thresholds are (ideally) determined by social-scientific research. 
Another difference is that, according to the relative norm, a certain share of the population will always 
be considered to have an affordability problem. This could become problematic when comparing coun-
tries that differ in terms of their general socio-economic conditions. An advantage of a relative norm is 
that it is fairly easy to apply. Relative norms are available for each country, which is not the case for 
the absolute norms. Moreover, a relative norm ties in with being able to participate in the society in 
question – thus, with social inclusion. 
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